Western interpreters of the Buddhist tradition have lavished what at times seems a disproportionate measure of attention on the enigmatic conception of nirvana. Most frequently that attention has focused on the question of whether or not the Theravida view in particular entails the total annihilation of the human personality. There has been no dearth of proponents for each of the various alternatives which this formulation of the issue allows. But in spite of considerable differences in the interpretations themselves, almost without exception the (at least) implicit claim for each one has been that it represents the original or the earliest ascertainable meaning of the term in Buddhist usage. This tendency is most evident in the writings of scholars like Hermann Oldenberg or T. W. Rhys Davids whose work is concerned primarily with the Pali Canon. But even a man like La Vallee Poussin, who strongly criticizes those who rely only on the Pali texts, in turn bases his own position on the contention that Buddhism was a popular religious faith before it became systematized into the philosophical form which it has in the Theravada Canon.'
Western interpreters of nirv.ana have not, to be sure, been unanimous in espousing such a static understanding of religion. Indeed, stated in this uncompromising form, it would no doubt be generally rejected as perhaps typical of uncritical devotees of a tradition but as unacceptable even to sympathetic observers. Yet because of its constant appeal to the criterion of earliest usage, one effect of Western scholarship on the question of nirvana has nonetheless been to reinforce a conception of the task of religious philosophy or apologetics as the restatement of the truth and relevance of immutable teachings. Specifically in reference to the conception of nirvana this understanding of the task of religious philosophy has resulted in an almost unanimous resistance, at least on the part of Theravada Buddhists, to a reinterpretation of this symbol which self-consciously modifies the meanings that it apparently has in what are taken to be the earliest texts. A consideration of the possibility of such a reinterpretation implies an understanding of religious systems which not only recognizes but also places a positive value on the fact of development in religious traditions. One serviceable approach is to consider religious systems as comprehensive symbolic 57 frames of reference through which individuals and communities interpret their experience and shape their living. In this view, modifications in a community's total experience would in time affect the symbols through which it interprets that experience. Conversely, the constantly reappropriated symbols would in turn provide criteria for evaluating and influencing the quality and the direction of changes in existing patterns of life. To adopt this approach to understanding religious systems and to explore its applicability to the conception of nirvana requires a procedure significantly different from that of most scholars in the past. Instead of focusing on the question of what meanings nirvana has in a given body of literature, the central concern becomes the significance of the similarities and differences between disparate interpretations of the same symbol. Even to raise this line of questioning of course presupposes the invaluable etymological and literary work which has been done on the uses of the term in the various texts and bodies of texts. But the difference in emphasis nonetheless remains, since the intention of the exploration is systematic and potentially constructive rather than primarily linguistic or historical.
II
One index of the systematic function which nirvana performs in Buddhist thought is the way in which the relationship between it and samsara is conceived. Although there has been considerable variation even within the same community, it seems justified to draw at least one generalized contrast between Theravada and Mahayana perspectives. Whereas for the Theravadin the fundamental motif in the interpretation of the relationship between nirvana and samsara has been that of contrast, the Mahayanist has typically expressed the conviction that they are ultimately identical. The difference between the two perspectives is not as total as this formulation suggests. But the divergence between them is sufficiently profound to invite a consideration of its possible causes and/or consequences.
One function of the symbol "nirvana" in the religious system of Theravada Buddhism is to provide a critical ideal which stands over against the phenomenal world. Nirvana is the absolute standard against which the whole of temporal existence is measured and judged as inadequate, as unsatisfactory, indeed, ultimately, as undesirable. Against the norm of nirvana, samsdra is seen in its true character-that is, as duhkha, "suffering." As an ethical ideal and ultimate value, the symbol of nirvana furnishes both the final criterion for evaluating temporal existence and the goal toward which all beings should aspire to escape the deficiencies of that existence. The most frequent characterizations of nirvdana reflect this dual function. On the one hand, it is designated as the antithesis of phenomenal life: it is not subject to birth, without becoming, undying; it is completely free from attachment and desire-in particular, from the summary evils of greed, hatred, and delusion; it is uninterupted peace, happiness, truth. On the other hand, nirvana is described metaphorically as the goal of those overcoming the world: it is the island amidst the floods, the further shore, the harbor of refuge, the cool cave, liberation, security.
To recognize the role of nirvana as a critical ideal over against temporal existence is not, of course, to adjudicate the perennial debates both among Buddhists themselves and even more vehemently among Western scholars as to what the term itself designates. A recognition of the multiple dimensions of this function is, however, sufficient to preclude any interpretation which reduces the meaning of nirvdna to the exclusive sense of annihilation of phenomenal existence; for the uses of nirvana as a critical ideal imply at least two additional complexes of meaning.
The first is evident when forms of the root from which the noun "nirvana" derives are used to describe the psychological or ethical state of the Buddhist saint or arhat. When the past participle in particular is used to characterize the arhat, it appears most frequently to refer to his having "cooled" or overcome attachment and craving; his having "extinguished" the fires of greed, Despite such parallels between the Mahayana and the Theravada positions, there are, however, considerable differences. Indeed, the differences are already evident in any attempt to formulate analogies between the two communities. A passage in the Lankavatara Sutra summarizes the contrast succinctly from the Mahayana perspective: "The gravakas and Pratyekabuddhas . .. have the discriminating idea and knowledge of Nirvana, which is not that of the truth... .'6
That the Theravada conception of nirvana is a discriminating one means, of course, that it is also a critical one. There are ethical criteria which must be met. Only those beings who achieve freedom from the five hindrances and the ten fetters, who overcome greed, hatred, and delusion, who cultivate the four sublime states of benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity, who attain detachment from phenomenal goods-only they attain nirvana. In contrast, the nondiscriminating Mahayana position is in principle uncritical. Not everyone, to be sure, achieves the insight that the whole of being is in its essence ultimate reality. For that accomplishment rigorous discipline over incomprehensibly long periods of time may be necessary. But it is nonetheless the case that the whole of being is in its essence ultimate reality. There is, to be sure, repeated reference to the preliminary role of morality and spiritual discipline. But from the ultimate perspective which the Madhyamika dialectic reveals, the defilements and evils and dualities against which moral and meditational disciplines are directed prove to be completely unreal. They must be so, since otherwise the absolute character of nirvana would be compromised:
The Absolute as Nirvana is conceived by some as the cessation of all desires and aversions. This implies that it was not existent before the destruction.... This is wrong according to the Madhyamika. There has been no initial fall, and there is no need for re-transformation. Nirvana, says Nagarjuna, is nonceasing, unachieved. There is only the dissolution of false views (kalpanaksaya), but no becoming in the real.14 Even more unambiguous is Murti's explicit differentiation of the Madhyamika conception of nirvana from those which maintain that "discrete existences (sarhskrta dharmas) are really changed into another state":
The Midhyamika brings out by his criticism that there is no change in things; if the klesas were real, they could not be reduced to nothing. There is only change in our outlook, not in reality. Nirvana is "what is not abandoned nor acquired... ." The function of prajina is not to transform the real, but only to create a change in our attitude towards it. The change is epistemic (subjective), not ontological (objective). The real is as it has ever been.15
That there are genuine differences between the Mahayana and Theravada interpretations of nirvana and its relation to samsdra is perhaps most evident in this denial of any need for other than epistemic change. A very telling passage at the end of Edward Conze's translation of and commentary on the Heart Satra may serve to epitomize the depth of the contrast. In that passage Conze sets himself the task of demonstrating how the Heart Sitra may be viewed as a Mahayana version of the Four Noble Truths. His elaboration of the parallels presupposes only one fundamental difference: in contrast to the Theravada the Mahayana believes that ill or suffering (duhkha) is ultimately unreal and illusory.l1 Insofar as this reinterpretation of the First Noble Truth is accepted, there is no need for real change as a precondition for beings to attain nirvJana who are caught in the net of samsara. But there is no suggestion in the Theravada understanding of the Four Noble Truths that duhkha is unreal or illusory. The Theravada position does, to be sure, agree with that of the Mahayana in focusing on subjective change-that is, on ethical and psychological transformation. But there is no relegation of such change to the status of unreality. Instead both the fact of duthkha and the possibility of deliverance from it are ultimate truths about man's experience.
Iv
In surveying the ways in which the Theravada and the Mahayana communities have formulated the relationship between nirvana and samsdra, it is difficult to escape the impression that each tradition has definite strengths from which the other could benefit. In the Theravada case, there is the manifest asset of a full appreciation that the religious task entails a straightforward confrontation with moral limitations and a concerted effort to overcome them-an effort, that is, to change the existing state of affairs. The result is a conception of nirvmna, which emphasizes differences from and consequently the need for changes in the prevailing patterns of phenomenal existence or samsara. The strength of the Mahayana lies in a different direction. Its insistence that nirvana and samnsara are ultimately one constitutes an at least potentially positive valuation of the whole of being. Hence the concern of the Mahayana Buddhist is with all of reality. All beings participate in the Buddha-nature; all are already ingredient in nirvana. That this broader concern is not simply an abstraction is There seems to be less indication that the Theravada interpretation of the relationship between nirvana and samsgra is evolving in a similar direction. The traditional emphasis on the distinction between nirvana and samsara with its recognition of the need for moral and psychological change in order to attain the "other shore" is of course highly conducive to a dynamic and critical ethic. But there seems to be little inclination to forge a position which systematically ascribes a positive status to phenomenal existence. Although traditional social virtues and lay ethics are extolled, the ultimate aim of the Buddhist life is still conceived as escape from samsara-samsara conceived in total contrast to nirvana. Hence the dominant theoretical judgment of phenomenal existence is one of sweeping rejection. This pattern is evident in the hierarchy of religious roles characteristic of Theravada Buddhist communities. The order of value begins with the ordinary layman, proceeds to the lay disciple and the monk with temple duties, and culminates with the monk who has retreated to an isolated hermitage in order to devote himself completely to meditation. The measure of status is inversely proportional to the measure of involvement with worldly tasks.21 The ideal of meditational and spiritual discipline is, of course, the common heritage of all streams in the Buddhist tradition. But the Theravida exemplifies it in particularly striking form because it has only a very subdued emphasis on the role of the arhat after he attains enlightenment. Indeed, among that very large proportion of Theravada Buddhists who believe that it is virtually impossible to attain arhatship in the present degenerate age, the question of a saint's post-enlightenment role is all but irrelevant. As a result, the task of promoting the happiness or alleviating the suffering of beings within the context of phenomenal existence is of decidedly secondary importance; and the question of directing or influencing the course of human history can have only a very limited and indirect religious significance.
Within the Theravada community of interpretation there are, of course, also indications of change. Increasing numbers of university-educated believers are, for example, rejecting the popular view of the unattainability of nirvana and insisting on understanding the goal of the Buddhist life as capable of realization here and now. With the support of university faculty in departments of Buddhist civilization, philosophy, and Pali, this growing stratum of intellectuals can marshal overwhelming textual support for its position. The question is, however, more serious when it is not one of documenting textual support but rather that of enriching or even modifying traditional interpretations. And this is what a rethinking of the relationship between nirvana and samsara would require. Among those Buddhist thinkers actively engaged in political life, there seems to be some inclination to move in this direction. They constitute only a very small minority; but they are, in effect, raising the crucial question of whether or not a religious system is viable in the twentieth century if it declines to interpret as religiously significant man's increasing capacity to shape his personal and corporate life within the sphere of phenomenal existence. To that question the Theravada as well as the Mahayana communities will be responding in one way or another during the coming decades.
